BWXT and Curtiss-Wright: The Two Nuclear Navy Names Arment Says Compound Quietly

On a recent episode of The Real Eisman Playbook, Baird’s Peter Arment named two small-cap industrials worth tracking that sit outside the headline defense story. Neither is a prime, neither is a Silicon Valley defense-tech startup, and neither makes drones. What they share is exposure to the US naval nuclear program, a relationship that began in the 1950s and is structurally growing through the late 2020s as the Columbia-class submarine production cycle ramps. The cleaner of the two is BWX Technologies. The more diversified is Curtiss-Wright. Arment’s direct framing for BWXT on the podcast: “We like the stock. Great management team. It’s just going to compound. It’s a great story.” This article anchors that framing to the corporate disclosures and lists the verification gaps.

Key facts at a glance

• BWXT is the sole manufacturer of naval nuclear reactor components and fuel for the US Navy, per the BWXT Naval Nuclear Propulsion page.
• The relationship dates to the USS Nautilus, launched in the 1950s. BWXT (formerly Babcock & Wilcox) designed and fabricated reactor components for the first nuclear-powered submarine.
• Current fleet support spans Ohio-class, Virginia-class, Seawolf-class, Los Angeles-class, and the new Columbia-class submarines, plus the Nimitz-class and Ford-class aircraft carriers.
• A naval nuclear reactor-component contract worth approximately $2.6B was announced across 2024 to 2025.
• BWXT services 19 CANDU heavy-water reactors in Canada through a business it acquired from General Electric.
• Curtiss-Wright runs three revenue threads: roughly 75% naval nuclear, 10% commercial aerospace (Boeing/Airbus duopoly), 15% general industrial. The company also has the qualification to produce for Westinghouse’s large 1-gigawatt nuclear reactor program.
• Arment cited a “close to 430 nuclear reactors” figure for BWXT’s historical naval production on the podcast. The specific number is not confirmed in any indexed public source. Treat it as his framing rather than a verified statistic.

Who is Peter Arment

Peter Arment is Senior Research Analyst and Managing Director for Aerospace and Defense at Robert W. Baird, per his Baird bio page. He joined Baird in 2016 after 23 years inside the aerospace and defense industry. On the same Eisman episode he covered Boeing, Airbus, the prime defense contractors, and the broader Silicon Valley defense-tech disruption story. BWXT and Curtiss-Wright are his picks within the “boring small-cap exposure to long-duration tailwinds” bucket of his coverage.

The Babcock & Wilcox legacy, and why the moat is unusual

The bilateral monopoly between BWXT and the US naval nuclear program is wider than almost any moat in US public equities. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is administered jointly by the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. It is a continuous program of nuclear-powered submarine and aircraft-carrier production that has run since the 1950s. There is one customer, which is the US government. There is one supplier of reactor components, which is BWXT.

The relationship traces back to Babcock & Wilcox, the engineering and construction firm that designed and fabricated the reactor for the USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, in the 1950s. B&W spun out its nuclear business as BWX Technologies in 2015. The corporate name changed; the program continuity did not. Every nuclear-powered ship the US Navy has built or refit since the Nautilus has used BWXT or B&W reactor components and fuel.

Arment used the “430 nuclear reactors” framing on the podcast to capture this cumulative scale. The specific number cannot be tied to BWXT’s own published materials. It is most likely a cumulative reactor-core count built by BWXT and its B&W predecessor since the 1950s. The cumulative scale is real; the specific figure should be treated as Arment’s framing.

Three revenue threads, all growing

BWXT’s revenue mix sits in three buckets, each with a different growth driver.

The CANDU service business is the underrated piece. BWXT bought the business from General Electric several years ago, Arment’s framing on the podcast was that GE sold it “before they knew what was going on in the world.” Canada operates 19 CANDU heavy-water reactors, and BWXT services them. As Canadian utilities refurbish those reactors for life extension, the aftermarket service revenue grows. The Government Operations base remains the largest single segment, but Commercial Operations is where the multi-year growth rate is most visible.

The Advanced Technologies thread is the optionality. No commercial small modular reactor has reached full operating scale in the US as of mid-2026. Several are in development. BWXT participates in the SMR opportunity through partnerships in the supply chain, not as a primary integrator. When AI data centers and industrial customers sign multi-year nuclear power-purchase agreements with utilities, that demand pulls SMR projects forward, and BWXT is positioned to supply components into those projects.

Curtiss-Wright: the same tailwind, more diversified

Arment named Curtiss-Wright alongside BWXT, and the two stories rhyme. The differences are in the revenue mix.

Roughly 75% of Curtiss-Wright’s revenue ties to the same naval nuclear program, different components than BWXT supplies, but the same end customer and the same multi-decade visibility. The other 25% splits between:

• Roughly 10% commercial aerospace. Curtiss-Wright supplies components to Boeing and Airbus, which means the company benefits from the same duopoly delivery ramp that drives Boeing’s 2025-2026 production recovery. Arment’s separate Boeing thesis on the same episode reinforces this thread: if 2028-2029 is a sustained delivery plateau for the global duopoly, Curtiss-Wright captures the aftermarket and component revenue all along.
• Roughly 15% general industrial. This is the most exposed-to-cycle piece of the business, but it is also where Curtiss-Wright’s Westinghouse qualification lives. Curtiss-Wright retains the capability to produce for Westinghouse’s large 1-gigawatt nuclear reactor program. That qualification is not common; building it requires NRC certification, multi-year quality programs, and supply-chain commitments that small competitors can’t replicate quickly.

The result is that Curtiss-Wright is a more diversified play on the same multi-decade naval-nuclear tailwind. The aftermarket business is growing in the mid-teens range as refurbishment cycles run. The general-industrial piece smooths what would otherwise be a single-customer concentration.

Why this fits inside the broader Arment framing

The same episode of The Real Eisman Playbook makes the broader case that defense spending is bifurcating: continued growth in legacy programs (the F-35 keeps shipping) and faster growth in VC-backed autonomy and drone capability. Arment is open about preferring the latter for fresh defense capital. The BWXT/Curtiss-Wright pair sits in a third bucket that he treats as the “boring compounder” position.

What makes them distinct is that they are not exposed to the drone-disruption thesis. Naval nuclear propulsion is not getting disrupted by cheap drones or by Silicon Valley software. The customer is the US Navy, the procurement schedule is locked into multi-decade defense authorizations, and the qualification barrier for new entrants is essentially infinite. The risk profile is “slow, dependent on Naval Reactors funding, vulnerable only to a major policy reversal”, not “vulnerable to a more nimble competitor.”

What this nuclear thesis does not tell you

The thesis is internally consistent. It also assumes specific things that are not yet proven.

• The Naval base is not infinite. Government Operations revenue is large and stable, but it grows on a submarine-and-carrier production schedule set in multi-year defense authorizations. The base can expand, but not at venture-stage growth rates.
• SMR commercial scale is not yet demonstrated. No commercial small modular reactor has reached full operating scale in the US to date. A commercial SMR ramp through 2030 is a base-case assumption, not a confirmed timeline.
• The “430 reactors” figure cannot be verified to a primary source. It is plausible as a cumulative reactor-cores count, but BWXT’s own materials describe the breadth of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion program differently. Treat the figure as Arment’s framing.
• Government revenue is concentration risk. The DoD and DOE are the largest customer by far. A material change in Naval Reactors funding would be binding.
• Curtiss-Wright general industrial is cyclical. The 15% general-industrial piece adds diversification but also tracks broader industrial cycles in a way the naval nuclear core doesn’t.

How the pair compares to other AI-power-adjacent names

BWXT and Curtiss-Wright are the upstream-equipment versions of the trade. Vistra and Constellation are the direct-power-sale versions. GE Vernova is the gas-and-grid version. Each one prices the AI-power thesis through a different lever.

FAQ

Is BWXT the only supplier to the US Navy?

For naval nuclear reactor components and fuel, yes. The relationship has been continuous since the USS Nautilus in the 1950s.

What is the CANDU connection?

BWXT services 19 CANDU heavy-water reactors in Canada through a business it acquired from General Electric. Aftermarket service revenue grows as those reactors get refurbished for life extension.

What does Curtiss-Wright actually do?

Roughly 75% naval nuclear (same end customer as BWXT, different components), 10% commercial aerospace (Boeing and Airbus suppliers), 15% general industrial. The general-industrial piece includes Curtiss-Wright’s qualification to produce for Westinghouse’s large 1-gigawatt reactor program.

Are small modular reactors operating commercially?

No commercial SMR has reached full operating scale in the US as of mid-2026. Multiple programs are in development. BWXT participates through partnerships in the supply chain, not as a primary integrator.

Where can I read these companies directly?

The BWXT investor relations page hosts BWXT’s 10-K, 10-Q, and earnings materials. Curtiss-Wright investor relations hosts the equivalent for CW. Baird Equity Research is the canonical published-research source for Arment’s coverage.